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In order to prove that mathematics cannot be
exhausted by a finite set of procedures, Alan
Turing conceives, in 1936, of an abstract
machine 1. The machine makes its debut in
“On Computable Numbers with an
application to the Entscheidungsproblem,”
his first major mathematical paper 2. A close
reading of this machine’s dynamic will show
that Turing’s thought in the field of
mathematics is a consciously embodied
thought that contemplates its own
incompleteness. By examining Turing’s
machine through the lens of incompleteness,
this project will reveal how, through his
extension into abstraction, Turing engages in
a paradoxically intensive movement that
reveals his body as inextricably enfolded in
thought. To understand this radical act of
contemplation, Turing must be situated
within a history of thinkers working against
totality, because in thinking his own
incompleteness, he refutes the idea that
systems are defined by completeness, or that
the unfolding of something is circumscribed
by that something as goal. This constellation
of thinkers includes Kurt Gödel, before
Turing, with his Incompleteness Theorem 3;
it also includes Gilles Deleuze, with his
explanation of how meaning gets made in
The Logic of Sense ,4 and Michel Foucault,
with his formulation of meaning’s dissolution
in “The Thought of the Outside.”5 Brian
Massumi then ushers this tradition into the
present by defining the limit of a human
being as immanent to that being in Parables
for the Virtual.6 Massumi grounds his theory 
in Deleuzeian and Foucauldian concepts,
themselves built from Turing’s legacy of lived
thought, which in turn is grounded in Gödel’s
theorem. Explaining these writers’ relation to
Turing’s work on incompleteness will reveal
the way in which systems of meaning are
always torn between their own constitution
and dissolution; this state of being torn will
clarify, in turn, the movement of Turing’s
mathematical body.
To understand the paper for which Turing
conceives his abstract machine, it must be
positioned in relation to Gödel’s On Formally
Undecidable Propositions, or his
Incompleteness Theorem.7 Gödel writes this
theorem in 1931 to disprove the first two of
three claims that David Hilbert made in 1928.8
Hilbert’s first claim is that mathematics is
complete, or that every statement can either
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be proved or disproved 9; his second claim is
that mathematics is consistent, or that a
statement is either true or false, and that
therefore mathematics is free of
contradiction. 10 Gödel manages to prove, for
a particular calculus system, that unprovability
is the founding kernel of that system.11 This
means that there are always propositions in
the system that can neither be proved nor
disproved. This neither/nor situation means
that something can be paradoxically true and
not true at the same time. This impossibility
means, for Gödel’s system, that the system
will always be incomplete. While he only
proves this for a single system, his method is
so powerful that it stands for every formal
system capable of representing arithmetic.12
Turing introduces his theoretical machine in
1936 in order to disprove the third of
Hilbert’s contentions: that there is a definite
method that can be applied to a statement to
decide whether it is provable.13 Turing tries to
imagine a machine that can decide the
provability of any assertion, basing it on what
he claims a human computer does when
working out calculations. Accordingly, it is
composed of three parts: the executive unit
carries out operations such as reading and
writing, the control ensures that instructions
are correctly carried out, while the store is a
store of information, and corresponds to a
human computer’s unlimited supply of paper,
whether this is paper on which she does her
calculations or that on which the book of
rules that determine her behavior is printed.14
This imaginary machine can therefore write,
read, and erase symbols on a moving paper
tape that he specifies should be of infinite
length, though in reality any such tape has to
be finite.15 Through this formulation, Turing
writes the description for a “universal
machine” that can do the work of any other
machine, provided it can be fed a description
of the task in the form of a coded table. 
Turing discovers a way to finitely express an
infinite number: for any number defined by a
rule, he can make a table explaining the rule.
If he feeds the table to his machine, the
machine will produce the number
theoretically, that is, it will take infinity to do
so.16 For example, if he wants to express, he
creates a table defining the rule that
produces the infinite decimal 3.14…. The
machine effectively consists of these tables
that Turing creates: it manifests as finite
abstractions that express infinite sequences.17
Turing calls any number that he can create a
table for a “computable number,” because
his theoretical machine can produce the
number in its abstract space.18 His machine is
configured to produce every computable
number, that is, every number for which one
can write a table explaining its rule.19
To show that there is no definite method to
discover whether a given statement is
provable, Turing applies a method invented
by Georg Cantor to his computing machine.12
Cantor originally used this method, called his
Diagonal Proof, to prove that the set of all
real numbers is greater than the set of all
rational numbers.21 The Diagonal Proof shows
how no list of real numbers can contain all
the real numbers, because any seemingly
complete list reveals, through a certain
diagonal method, yet another number not
included in the list.22 This paradox
demonstrates how the rational gives rise to
the irrational and the finite (or complete) to
the infinite (or always incomplete).23 When
Turing applies this method to his machine,
with its seemingly complete account of all
computable numbers, he shows that just as
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the rational gives rise to the irrational, the
computable can give rise to the
uncomputable, and an uncomputable
number constitutes an unsolvable problem.
But more important for the current project of
showing how Turing’s machine stands as an
expression of his own incompleteness, Cantor
and Turing’s results clearly indicate that a
seemingly complete set or system will always
reveal itself as incomplete. Thus, Turing
concludes, there is no definite method to
decide whether assertions are provable, since
unsolvable problems will always reveal
themselves. Therefore, mathematics cannot
be exhausted by any finite procedure. 
This proof situates Turing, along with Gödel,
in a constellation of mathematicians and
philosophers working against totality. The
move away from the conceptualization of a
system (be it a calculus, a language or a
world) as a totality with a complete, definable
set of elements is crucial because this move
allows for the existence of pure difference:
something always differing, always else,
always excluded. The refutation of totality is a
move away from dialectics and it embraces
proliferation and openness. In this vein,
Turing’s machine demonstrates that any
system, or for our purposes, any determinate
thing, is always in relation to indeterminacy,
and that one never really knows what this
realm of indeterminacy will produce. The
non-existent abundance of this realm’s
potential productions is like a shadow or
underside to the actual world. It does not
consist of anything that one can point directly
at, but it instead looms, just outside the
frame, maintaining that nothing is ever quite
set; instead, uncomputable newness subsists
in everything. 
The philosopher Gilles Deleuze also figures
into this constellation of anti-totality thinkers.
In The Logic of Sense in 1969, Deleuze
proceeds from Gödel and Turing to elaborate
the movement of “sense” as a subsistence
that enables meaning to cohere.24 Deleuze’s
work complements an understanding of
Turing’s abstract machine because Deleuze is
concerned with how meaning gets made.
Turing uses his machine to reveal the
potential excess that haunts a system’s
meaning; Deleuze continues this project, and
an explanation of how he does so will help to
unpick how thought functions in Turing’s
work. The key concepts we need to take
from Deleuze are his definition of sense as a
subsisting immanent limit, his differentiation
of the corporeal and incorporeal, and his use
of series to explain the proliferation of
meaning. These three concepts will help to
show the always-embodied nature of Turing’s
contemplation of incompleteness.
Deleuze distinguishes between the corporeal,
which consists of bodies, words and things
that exist, and an incorporeal realm of
becoming, which subsists or inheres.25 Sense
is an incorporeal entity26 that gives meaning
to discourse.27 It is made up of pure
becoming or infinite identity: it always moves
in both directions at once, which means that
it is not limited by the physical or the
personal.28 Sense is a movement of
difference: the differing of a thing from itself
as well as what is not itself, differing from its
own differing and always diverging from
itself. This difference is the movement of
change: pure newness; in its differing, it
enables relation. Sense is not the signifier or
the signified, but the relation between
them;29 it traverses the gap between words
and things, constituting their border.30 Sense
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is like an empty place that results from a
constant inadequacy between the signifier
and the signified.31 Systems of meaning are
always incomplete because sense is partly
absent, like a phantom that enables the
entire world.32
Deleuze uses the idea of series, based on the
mathematical concept of recursion, to explain
the cohering movement of sense.33 He
describes sense as a self-displacement: as the
entity that enables meaning to manifest, it is
constantly moving in its role as incorporeal
glue.34 Recursion is the enabling of what
comes next in a related string of numbers (or
of anything else, for example, words, colors
or ideas). In his introduction to Gödel’s
theorem, R.B. Braithwaite explains, 
Recursive definition enables every
number in a recursively defined
infinite sequence to be constructed
according to a rule, so that a remark
about the infinite sequence can be
constructed as a remark about the
rule of construction and not about a
given infinite totality.35
Recursion enables knowledge, experience or
reality to snowball or to differ indefinitely,
and it allows one to conceptualize this
differing in terms of its “rule.” In other
words, the movement of a series can be
understood as an expression of its rule of
construction; the logic of something can be
understood in terms of the way it moves, as
opposed to its destiny in a given telos. 
Sense links the variables in a series together,
manifesting as the linking movement of the
recursive. Deleuze explains,
Sense is always presupposed as soon
as I begin to speak: I would not be
able to begin without this
presupposition. In other words, I
never state the sense of what I am
saying. But… I can always take the
sense of what I say as the object of
another proposition whose sense, in
turn, I cannot state..36
In other words, a series is like a chain: the
beginning of each link is presupposed but
unidentifiable until it is taken as the basis for
the next link. This two-step process of first,
the name that denotes something and
second, the name that denotes the sense of
the first name, is the minimal condition for
the proliferation of meaning.37 Making sense
the object of the new proposition amounts to
what Deleuze calls “taking care of the
sense.”38 Therefore it is the care, and not any
total outcome, that determines meaning.
Meaning’s recursive movement is propelled by
sense as it circulates, weaving signifiers and
signifieds together, constituting their
collective incompleteness. What is in excess in
a given signifier is, Deleuze writes, an empty
square, an always-moving place without an
occupant. What is lacking, on the other
hand, in the signified is an unknown
occupant without a place - something always
displaced. This excess and lack are two
uneven sides of the same thing.39 Systems of
meaning are always incomplete because one
side of sense is always absent from the other.
It has a curious flip-flopping personality: its
excess always refers to its own lack. This is
how the meaningful world is constructed; it
consists of ever-proliferating corporeal series,
enabled by incorporeal, flip-flopping sense.
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Recursion is relevant in a discussion of
Turing’s thought for two linked reasons: it
clarifies the nature of his machine’s
movement and, as we will see, reveals a
parallel between this movement and Turing’s
own dynamic as he contemplates difference.
The theorem in which his machine is
expressed (and which the machine itself
expresses) is dependent on recursion to show
how mathematics can never be exhausted by
any finite procedure. His machine proves that
any seemingly complete system will
proliferate, producing more numbers that,
while they are in excess of the system, are
technically also part of the system. Their
coming-into-existence simultaneously
completes the apparently complete system,
and extends the system further, poising it for
the next recursive move as it anticipates its
own unformed difference. 
The paper tape on which Turing’s machine
inscribes its calculations and from which it
derives its rules is the surface on which the
machine’s difference moves. While the strings
of symbols inscribed on the tape are finite,
they theoretically continue for infinity; while
these symbols constitute a form of
representation, they also demonstrate that
representation’s limit. A sensual transgression
of the machine’s own limit occurs on the
tape’s surface as the paper moves in and out
of the machine’s parts. While all three parts
of the machine are essential for its
functioning, the paper strip both holds the
logic-as-movement for the machine itself and
reveals its incompleteness as always recursive.
While the strings of digits physically inscribed
on the tape play out each computable
number’s logic-as-movement, the inscription
of these digits leads to the thesis that none
could be the final string, that none could
constitute the completing factor of their
system (in this case, the imagined complete
set of computable numbers): that each one’s
role is to make way for the next surprise. 
In standing as an expression of its own
recursion, the machine points to the
difference that is excluded in totality: the
constant proliferation that meaning could not
function without. One-sided and endless, the
paper tape is the surface this difference
fleetingly frequents, in between inscribed
digits, hovering over each decision, each
symbol marked, erased or passed over. The
machine refers to the pure difference that
enables, indeed forces, its system to remain
open, to forever reveal new numbers: it refers
to its own difference. Of course, in a way,
anything, as actual and finite, both refers to
its difference and expresses its
incompleteness and transitoryness. In this
sense, everything is a performance indexing
both its own imminent disappearance and its
recurrent change. Deleuze cites the
interlacing of this disappearance and newness
of change when he says that sense always
refers to its own lack, flip-flopping between
an empty space without an occupant and an
occupant without a space to inhabit.40
Turing’s machine differs from any other given
thing that carries with it its own
incompleteness because the machine
purposefully plays difference’s drama out on
its surface- its mechanism points explicitly (as
explicitly as is possible to point to something
unlocatable) to the process through which
meaning gets made. Thus the paper tape
lights itself up as a surface of difference, like
a motion-activated security light. 
While Deleuze’s constructive formulation of
meaning helps to show the machine’s
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recursive movement, Foucault offers a
contrasting theory of meaning’s dissolution in
“The Thought of the Outside” in 1966. Like
Deleuze’s logic of sense, Foucault’s theory is
built on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem,
and it offers two important elements for our
project: it further clarifies the abstract
machine’s self-revealing movement as going
toward absence and impossibility, and it
relates this movement more explicitly to the
action of thought than does Deleuze’s
elucidation of sense.41 Gathering these two
elements and adding them to the three we
gained from Deleuze will enable us to make
the jump from Turing’s machine to Turing
himself: to shift our focus from the machine’s
movement to the specifics of Turing’s radical
contemplation. 
Foucault wants to set up a kind of thought
that articulates its own end, one that can
illuminate its dispersion at its own limit. He
describes this, his thought’s action, as 
taking in only its invincible absence…
in order to regain the space of its
unfolding, the void serving as its site,
the distance in which it is constituted
and into which its immediate
certainties slip the moment they 
are glimpsed.42
In other words, he wants to practice a
thought that immerses itself in its own
absence and impossibility, writing, “What
counts in men’s thoughts is… the non-
thought that systematizes them from the
outset.”43 (Here one sees the similarity to
Deleuze’s formulation of sense as that crucial
non-entity which enables the corporeal
realm.) He calls this “the thought of the
outside,” describing it as using “language
about the outside of language, speech about
the invisible side of words.”44 This discourse
of the outside is “a listening less to what is
articulated in language than to the void
circulating between its words, to the murmur
that is forever taking it apart.”45
In the image of the outside as the void
circulating between words, one sees clearly
the link between Foucault’s outside and
Deleuze’s formulation of sense as an always
circulating, self-displacing empty place.46 But
here also one finds a seeming difference
between them: while Deleuze emphasizes the
constitutive role that sense plays in its
weaving together of words and things,
Foucault instead emphasizes the process of
meaning coming undone. By reading
Deleuze’s formulation of sense alongside
Foucault’s outside, one lays bare the mixed
pleasure and danger of meaning being made
and unmade. Considering the
contemporaneous constitution and
dissolution of meaning, or the entering and
falling of the pre-discursive into and out of
discourse, reveals that the “next” of recursion
is simultaneously a birth and death. Neither
action could exist without the other, and they
are in fact one and the same process: that of
pure difference shifting. The constitution and
dissolution of meaning occurs as difference
breathes in and out or shifts in the night;
this, difference’s movement, manifests as
meaning entering into and being destroyed
at the limit of discourse. 
The outside is like a mouth that both offers
up the abstract machine’s strings of numbers
and swallows them in a single movement
(except that it is not single, but rather pure
and everywhere, although of course it is also
nowhere). What the machine expresses is
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that the infinite (or the machine’s difference
from itself, that which (it) is not and can
never be) serves as the un-centered core of its
system’s meaning. This, the machine’s
expression, is crucially related to Deleuze and
Foucault’s theories of meaning because, in it,
the machine acknowledges the outside as, to
revisit the above quotation, “the void serving
as its site.” This realm of infinity is “the
distance in which [the machine] is
constituted…” and “into which its
uncertainties slip the moment they are
glimpsed…;” in other words, what the
machine renders certain (i.e. the computable
numbers) immediately slip into the outside at
the precise moment that they are rendered.
Foucault explains one manifestation of what
he calls “the pure, most naked experience of
the outside”47 as a kind of attraction.48
Outlining this “attractive” contemplation of
the outside will help to show how Turing
enacts it. This attraction is, for Foucault, a
contradictory voyaging toward the dissolving
nothing that constitutes the outside. Foucault
describes the dynamic of this attraction: 
The outside cannot offer itself as a
positive presence… but only as an
absence that pulls as far away from
itself as possible, receding into the
sign it makes to draw one toward it,
as though it were possible to reach it.
Attraction… has nothing to offer but
the infinite void that opens beneath
the feet of the person it attracts, the
indifference that greets him as if he
were not there, a silence too insistent
to be resisted and too ambiguous to
be deciphered and definitively
interpreted…49
Thus attempting to follow or express the
outside is a paradoxical experience. Turing’s
machine approaches that which can only
offer itself “as an absence that pulls as far
away from itself as possible,” and when
Foucault writes that this non-entity “[recedes]
into the sign it makes to draw one toward
it,” we can see that even as the outside
forms the machine’s computable numbers,
and even as we are drawn toward these
signs, “as though it were possible to reach
[them],” it dissolves into them and leaves us
grasping the air, empty-handed. Foucault
describes the attracting yet dissolving nature
of a movement toward the outside as 
going toward the light in negligence
of shadow, until it is discovered that
the light itself is only negligence, a
pure outside equivalent to a darkness
that disperses, like a blown-out
candle, the negligent zeal it has
attracted.50
As well as standing in for the outside,
Foucault’s image of the dispersing blown out
candle represents the movement of recursion
illuminated by Turing’s machine. In other
words, Turing’s articulation of incompleteness
constitutes a thought of the outside: the
machine indicates the infinitely expanding
space between digits, sequences and things,
a nonexistent space constitutive of all
meaning, all discourse. The expansive void of
the outside, located, for Foucault, in between
words, is the abyss Turing conceptually
tightrope walks the edge of by thinking it in
“On Computable Numbers.”
It is important to note carefully Foucault’s
emphasis of meaning’s unraveling nature;
stopping at the observation that Turing, like
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Deleuze, formulates recursive movement as
building the next link from the one before,
would inhibit our consideration of Turing’s
contemplation, in that the consideration
would be merely constructive, or
unidirectional. In order to go further in our
analysis, pure recursion must be considered
to encompass both constitution and
dissolution, because meaning depends on the
simultaneity of these processes to maintain
itself, ever poised, flickering at its own limit.
The Gödelian notion that incompleteness lies
at the core of any structure suggests that a
given series of digits or, for example, images
or musical notes is dependent on the
yawning fact of its uncertainty for its
meaning. The incompleteness both courses
through a series as its links and surrounds
that series as its limit; each aspect of this
incompleteness constitutes the series in its
very being. The outside is not simply outside,
which is to say that it is not simply a gaping
abyss that looms, waiting for one to die,
outside the borders of being. It is precisely
every being’s immanent limit, the limit that
we carry with us, which constitutes us as
meaning beings. It is here, in Foucault’s
hinting at the outside’s immanence to a
system or being, that his debt to Gödel 
(and perhaps his similarity to Deleuze) 
is most evident. Thus in its grappling 
with incompleteness, Turing’s thought 
of the outside teeters at this point of
simultaneity where meaning comes together
and falls apart. 
The aim of this project is ultimately to map a
link from the abstract machine to Turing
himself: to expand from the machine’s
movement of meaning to Turing’s own
relation to the outside. In order to do this, it is
necessary to zoom out from the restricted
notion of “thought” to that of “embodied
thought.” The theories outlined thus far have
helped elucidate Turing’s machine’s position as
simultaneously being constituted and
dissolving at its own limit as strings of infinite
numbers continue to reveal themselves. But to
what degree can one apply this supposition
regarding the movement of meaning to
thinking, embodied human beings? The
question now becomes: to what degree does
Turing himself recur; to what degree is he
coming apart? How is Turing, as an embodied
thinker, always undone as he teeters at his
own discursive limit? As we shall see, he not
only expresses the machine’s difference from
itself, but in a kind of opening onto himself,
he also references his own difference. What
Turing finally accomplishes is a tweaking or
antagonizing of his own immanent limit,
marked by the simultaneity of constitution
and dissolution, in order to reveal how
meaning forms. However, to consider the
recursive movement of a thinking human
body such as Turing’s, and to explicitly
describe the relation of this movement to a
human’s immanent limit, a recon-
ceptualization of the mind/body split 
is necessary.
Brian Massumi offers a fresh problematization
of this routinely attacked split. His theory of
embodiment encompasses Foucault’s notion
of meaning’s unraveling; carefully laying out
Massumi’s theory will help relate this
unraveling motion to the embodied thinker’s
own situation in meaning. Massumi builds his
argument on all three of Deleuze’s concepts
so far outlined: the immanent limit of sense,
the recursion of series and the corporeal/
incorporeal duality. Deleuze assigns the
minded body to the realm of the corporeal,
while this minded body’s ungraspable,
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cohering relation to itself belongs to the
realm of incorporeality.51 Massumi proceeds
from this distinction by relating corporeality to
abstraction in two ways. First, he radicalizes
the relation by asking the question: What if
the space of the body is really abstract?52
What if the body is inseparable from
dimensions of lived abstractness, dimensions
that it envelops yet which enable its
existence? He proposes that the body’s
ultimate innards are as abstract, as
incorporeal, as the insides of and space
between atoms or neurons: the atomic and
subatomic particles that make up “matter”
are separated by voids larger than they
themselves are, and each particle’s own
insides are un-solid, virtual, abstract.53 The
space in which atoms relate to each other is
infinitely divisible; another way of saying this
is that there are immeasurable gaps between
things, the ungraspable nature of which gaps
allows them to gain meaning as things. 
This suggestion of constitutive
immeasurability is akin to the paradoxical
proposition of infinite divisibility advanced by
Zeno in his Dichotomy: that (1) between two
sides of the same street there are infinitely
many points, (2) thus the street is uncrossable
because one could never reach an infinity of
successive points in a finite time, yet (3) one is
able to cross the street.54 This abstract space
between the two sides of Zeno’s street is a
virtual space of potential that enables the
finite street to cohere as such.55 Thus the
body, Massumi posits, is,
the holding-together of… 
virtual innards as they fold out,
recursive-durationally, in the loopy
present, in determinate form and 
configuration, always provisional
because always in becoming.56
In other words, a minded body is a perpetual
unfolding of itself. The abstract inside of the
body is constantly becoming; it is constantly
actualizing as graspable matter. 
When Massumi uses the word “abstract” 
in this context, he is referring to habits,
memories and tropisms: the recursive
thought-perceptions that make up a person.57
In this first sense, “abstract” means the
relations that enable the body to cohere. 
The inside of the body does not consist only
of intestines and bones, but also of the
ungraspable relation of the body to itself. 
The body’s recursion lies in its perpetual self-
generation, which is enacted in its relation to
itself. This self-relation is the “self-disjunctive
coincidence of a thing’s immediacy to its own
variation,”58 or the continuity of sameness
and heterogeneity (or, Heidegger would say,
identity and difference).59 To clarify this notion
of “self-disjunctive coincidence,” we need
only to recall the abstract machine’s
contemporaneous inhabitation of its current
state and its next recursive move.
Consequently the body is simultaneously itself
and what it is becoming, as well as what it
will have left behind. This is the body in
series: its recursive self-differing movement
from virtual to actual and back again. 
In his second consideration of the body’s
relation to abstraction, Massumi formulates
that there are two aspects to the body’s self-
conscious recursion: thought and perception
are two poles of a single continuum.
Perception, or feeling, is the anticipation of a
next action in relation to the current and last
one, while thought unfolds itself from feeling
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into concrete possibilities.60 Perception senses
potential, while thought is a systematic
simplification of potential into possibility:
thought turns anticipation into predictability.
Abstraction is a separating out of thought
from perception; the ability to abstract
distinguishes human intelligence.61 But
abstraction paradoxically also intensifies
perception, because “objectivity” makes
more possibilities more anticipatable, thus
more accessible as “nexts” or “mores.” A
perception’s generalization or systematization
returns to it as an augmentation of its
singular multiplicity; its loss returns in the
form of a gain.62
The inextricability of experience and extension
into possibility ensures that every perception
is also an analysis, and every concept that is
grasped is also felt. Sensation is the name
Massumi gives to a limit of experience that 
is immanent to every step of thought-
perception along the continuum (his debt to
Deleuze’s formulation of sense as a linking
subsistence is most evident here).63 Sensation
is the point of conversion where perception
unfolds into thought and thought infolds into
perception. It is “the registering of the
multiplicity of potential connections in the
singularity of a connection actually under
way” (again, one may recall the abstract
machine, poised in anticipation of its next
indication of incompleteness)64 Thanks to this
pure sense of multiplicity over singularity, the
thought-perception continuum operates
recursively: intelligence itself consists of the
reality of an excess over the actual, which
means that there is always a “next” or a
“more.” A given moment extends beyond
itself in a way that is both thought and 
felt, anticipated, in the form of a yearning 
or tending.65
In the first sense of the word “abstract,”
then, Massumi means the virtual: Deleuze’s
incorporeal realm. This abstract realm can
also be called the outside. Abstract refers to
the infinitely divisible space between things,
to a thing’s relation to itself. When Massumi
says that the inside of the body is really
abstract, he doesn’t mean that the center is
abstract, but rather that there is neither
center nor “complete” body; instead, the
body in series unfolds because of the infinite
non-substance that courses through it. This
“coursing” doesn’t actually exist: instead, like
Gödel’s incompleteness, Turing’s unprovability,
Deleuze’s sense and Foucault’s outside, it
subsists, thus enabling what we think of, and
live, as a minded body. In the second sense of
the word “abstract,” Massumi is talking
about thought activity: conceptualization,
generalization, and problematization. In the
second sense, abstraction simplifies things,
charting them out.
The first kind of abstraction, as pure virtuality,
is the immanent limit of the second kind, as
the extension of embodied thought. The
incorporeality of sense can be thought of as
pure meaning that follows thought’s
recursion, threading together perception and
thought. But while it is always subsistent, it is
also unlocatable: it never actualizes as itself,
as pure sensation. Because of their perpetual
folding into each other, thought is always
sensual and feeling always conceptual;
although thought both extends away from
perception and links back to it, always
passing through the intensity of sensation,
thought can never actually access that
enabling sensation (notice here the similarity
to Foucault’s paradoxical attraction).
Thought’s role in the recursive “next” of
intelligence is inseparable from embodied
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perception; sensation, as pure abstractness, is
what binds thought and embodiment
together as inseparable.
This embodied movement of pure
abstractness further indicates that Foucault’s
outside is as much within us as outside us.
The theoretical abyss that constitutes
Foucault’s outside is immanent to the self; it
constitutes the self by constantly displacing
itself, or as both Deleuze and Foucault put it,
“circulating.” While Turing’s machine
references the outside from which it enters
into discourse and into which its digits plunge
as they recur, his thought itself functions as a
macrocosm of the machine, flickering at the
point between the self and its limit, at that
point of simultaneity where the outside
violently stitches together and meticulously
pulls apart meaning. Massumi’s limit of pure
sensation folds in and out as a single surface,
constituting meaning as it moves, just as the
outside constitutes and dissolves discourse in
a continual movement of making things
mean. This immanent outside is one’s
difference from oneself, the difference that
Deleuze and Massumi have elaborated as the
un-centered core of meaning.
From this un-centered core, Turing folds out
into himself, into series, into thought.
Massumi’s supposition that intelligence is the
reality of an excess over the actual further
indicates that Turing’s abstract machine’s
movement echoes the nature of thought, in
that the machine is constantly posed, in its
singularity, at a junction of multiplicity.
Turing’s mathematical activities strain toward
pure meaning (or to use Massumi’s word,
sensation), but via the recursive movement so
crucial to his proof, he simultaneously marks
as evident the current, inevitable absence of
this cohering entity. This unfolding of
recursion is at the same time an “out-
folding,” or a coming apart. In this way,
Turing and his machine are constantly
disintegrating at their respective limits: their
constitution as systems of meaning ensures
this. Thus the idea of intelligence as
recursion, as an excess over the actual of any
given moment, idea or image, illuminates the
nature of Turing’s thought to be a straining
movement toward that abstractness which
constitutes and courses through it, but can
never be accessed.
Therefore if, following Massumi, the inside of
Turing’s body is really abstract, then this
straining that constitutes his most extensively
abstract activities is also a highly intensive
movement, in two ways. First, his thought
activities in mathematics fuel the folding of
new possibilities back into perception, which
in turn feels out pending potential before
delivering it back to thought to sort out. The
thought extension that folds out from the a-
center of Turing’s body runs seamlessly into
and constitutes the abstract realm he studies,
like a Möbius strip made from thought.
Secondly, Turing strains, through his machine,
toward the abstract realm of the outside.
Because this realm is unlocatable, his is an a-
directional straining. In his thought-extension,
he touches upon the virtuality that makes the
world have meaning, but simultaneously
reaches for both his own virtual inners and
their holding-together, the pure abstractness
of his own self-relation. 
This straining movement characterizes the
suffering of a thought that approaches
difference. Turing realizes that any system
intended to catalog every element of that
system will inevitably fail, because other
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elements will always be revealed. Therefore
what Turing’s theorem in fact expresses is the
acute inadequacy of expression itself to
account for a thing’s logic. Expression’s failure
is precisely that it is an account: a formulated
representation of movement-as-logic (the very
idea of movement-as-logic is a static
representation). The closest Turing’s machine
comes to expressing the suffering failure of
thought is that it echoes the incompleteness
of the world in its own inadequacy to grab
hold of the enabling entity behind meaning’s
constitutive process. Even the expression of a
thing’s movement, which emphasizes its
change, is a cataloguing of that movement.
In considering the machine’s expression of its
own inadequacy, one essentially witnesses
expression shooting itself in the foot, which is
the best it can do, under the circumstances
(the best, at least, from the point of view of a
philosophy approaching difference), because
this self-mutilating act gives way to the
refutation of totality, the fragmentation of
representation and the proliferation of
absolutes. This is the closest one comes to
being able to think difference: a weak echo
of inherent incompleteness is, so far, the
strongest philosophical tool. Turing’s straining
is akin to what James Bernauer calls
Foucault’s “cry of spirit”- his expression of a
desire to inhabit the limit of thought in order
to think difference.66 What expression needs
is a way to gallop alongside the proliferation
of sense or the disintegration of the outside
while retaining self-consciousness, but this is
practically impossible, so one instead holds
on for dear life to the (representational) 
idea of every thing and system’s perpetual
role as fragment. 
This, Turing’s radical form of contemplation,
constitutes, as do Gödel, Deleuze, Foucault
and Massumi’s theories, a pleasurable but
dangerous kind of “playing with yourself”: 
a toying with one’s immanent limit in order
to provoke oneself into going further. This
“further” is a voyage of Foucauldian
attraction into one’s abstract depthlessness
(rather than plunging into one’s depth, it is 
a discovering of the most pure, unfolded
patch of the outside’s surface). It is in this
topological sense that the question of
thinking difference is a sensuous
epistemological question: thinking is always
sensuous to the extent that it is in constant
contact with its own surface, the surface that
ripples as discourse is constituted as such.
This notion of “its own surface” evokes the
abstract machine’s endless tape that indicates
its own incompleteness. Further, it recalls the
thought extension that runs seamlessly from
the a-center of Turing’s body into the abstract
realm he studies, forming a continual surface
of thought. Explicitly trying to think
difference simultaneously folds this surface
further and straightens it out in order to see
the outside: it is a flurried, multiplicitous
movement in both directions at once, an
attempted coming to rest in pure movement.
Searching for one’s own constitutive
incompleteness can pull the thinking self
apart: thought never quite reaches the pure
orgasm of sensation, since in order to be
thought it must either be about to pass or
have just passed through the outside. For
thought to reach its climax, for it to reach it
and to rest there, would be to inhabit death.
In this sense thought is always a tease:
always promising a climax but fundamentally
unable to follow through. Practicing a
philosophy of difference is pleasurable
precisely because it borders on danger: the
danger of self-effacement, of (becoming)
nothing. To think the outside is to connect to
14 Abstract Body, Abstract Machine
one’s own incompleteness; in straining
toward this “silence too insistent to be
resisted and too ambiguous to be
deciphered,” one searches for one’s 
own obliteration.
Thus Turing’s machine is a mathematical
expression of the way in which the self is
always torn between her own constitution
and dissolution. By reading Turing and his
machine through Deleuze, Foucault and
Massumi’s theories of meaning, it becomes
evident that it is precisely this torn-ness that
makes meaning possible. The subject and
action of Turing’s radical contemplation is the
way in which, as a system of meaning
himself, he carries infinity with him, a barely
perceptible, potentially debilitating,
constitutive feature of his being. This means
that as far as Turing can think, pure
abstraction is just beyond him, enveloping
him and bordering the furthest he can reach.
His work in pure mathematics attempts to
follow, and is followed at every turn by, its
own incompleteness. This, Turing’s movement
of following or “attracting,” communicates
an intimate link between meaning, birth and
death: meaning as a sort of dance around
the outside, or the outside as pure
movement, pure internal sensation, and
meaning as its residue. For this volatile purity
is also located inside Turing himself: it is his
relation to himself. This, finally, is Turing’s
mathematical body: a body inextricable from
its mindedness, folding out from and toward
pure abstraction, in constant struggle with its
own difference from itself.
Afterward
Rather than simply treating the theme of
anti-totality, I have tried in this project to take
the recursive thematic on as methodology, by
considering Turing’s own rule of construction,
as opposed to expressing what Turing and his
work might mean in terms of their coming to
rest in a final goal. Besides the logic that
Massumi offers above, I would like to
emphasize that Turing’s rule of construction
consists, crucially, in his antagonizing of his
own limit in order to execute his
hermeneutics. Because of this self-
antagonizing, Turing and his work remain
recursively poised, in that they intrinsically
anticipate further and further modification, 
of which this project is only one example. 
The question I must now ask myself turns out
to be, Assuming that I have succeeded in
realizing this recursive methodological
position, how have I constructed my remark
about Turing’s infinite sequence? In
considering this, I recall Deleuze’s assertion
that the process by which one expresses the
meaning of one’s last sentence in the current
one, thereby linking them, amounts to
“taking care of the sense.” Following this
remark, I position myself with Turing as I
endeavor to enact this care on several levels,
not only through the current project but also
in a more mundane, everyday sort of caring,
a mode of living thoughtfully that mimics his.
Both modes of care are dependent on
opposition to the notion of a “finished”
work: I do not intend to present Turing’s
work as a completed oeuvre, or, indeed, to
deem my own project’s state as finished.
Instead, I want to think and write about
openness: the continually open state of a
system, Turing’s opening onto his own limit
as he thinks the latter, and my own opening
onto myself as I contemplate all three. In this
project, I have tried to trace these links in
order to explore what it means to consciously
inhabit that junction of simultaneity at which
one is always recursively poised, the one that
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Turing’s machine illustrates so clearly. In
tracing these links, one discovers a
preliminary position from which to define
Deleuze’s “care” by consciously enacting it.
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